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Investigators often have multiple suspects to interview in order to determine whether
they are guilty or innocent of a crime. Nevertheless, co-offending has been significantly
neglected within the deception detection literature. The current review is the first of
its kind to discuss co-offending and the importance of examining the detection of
deception within groups. Groups of suspects can be interviewed separately (individual
interviewing) or simultaneously (collective interviewing) and these differing interviewing
styles are assessed throughout the review. The review emphasizes the differences
between lone individuals and groups. It focuses on the theoretical implications of group
deceit and the reasons why groups need to be understood in terms of investigative
interviewing and deception detection if all types of crime-related incidents are to be
recognized and dealt with appropriately. Group strategies, consistency within- and
between-statements, joint memory, and group dynamics are referred to throughout the
review and the importance of developing interview protocols specifically for groups is
discussed. The review concludes by identifying the gaps in the literature and suggesting
ideas for future research, highlighting that more research is required if we are to obtain a
true understanding of the deception occurring within groups and how best to detect it.
Keywords: group deception, interviewing, strategies, consistency, memory
Imagine you are the police investigators involved in the 2013 UK case whereby two males, Michael
Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, brutally murdered Lee Rigby, an off duty British Army soldier.
The attack was motivated by terrorism and several others were thought to be involved. At the scene,
the two main perpetrators were apprehended and separated to be interviewed about the offense.
All other suspects were also interviewed separately. This is because traditionally perpetrators are
separated during police investigations to increase anxiety and reduce planning of responses (Kassin
and Gudjonsson, 2004). However, how would you have interviewed them? Could they have been
interviewed together? Do you think that group crimes (crimes committed by more than one
individual) require the use of different interviewing tactics to solo crimes (crimes committed by
only one individual)? What cues to deceit would you focus on? Do you think cues to deceit differ
depending on whether the crime is a solo offense or a group offense? The answers to these questions
are critical for an effective police investigation and suspect interview, yet police manuals say very
little about these issues with researchers only recently addressing such questions.
Deception detection research has primarily focused on developing an understanding of
the strategies that individuals employ when lying or telling the truth about solo crimes, and
furthermore what interviewing techniques can be employed by investigators to enable individual
liars to be more easily differentiated from individual truth-tellers (e.g., Vrij, 2008; Clemens et al.,
2010; Warmelink et al., 2012). However, despite lone individuals being the focus of deception
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detection research, investigators are often faced with situations
whereby they must interview more than one person. Group
(or co-) offending (an offense committed by two or more
people) is common (McGloin et al., 2008) and on the rise (van
Mastrigt and Farrington, 2011). Studies suggest that co-offending
accounts for between 10 and 17% of police recorded offenses
with between 22 and 30% of offenders being involved in co-
offending (Carrington, 2002; Hodgson, 2007; Van Mastrigt and
Farrington, 2009; D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2010; Ouellet et al.,
2013). However, co-offending statistics need to be interpreted
with caution. This is because the data available tends to only
represent those offenders who have been charged or detected,
resulting in a sizeable dark figure of co-offending (e.g., a crime
may be recorded as a solo event when in fact investigators are just
unaware that more offenders were involved).
Co-offending is just one circumstance that would require
the investigation of more than one person. Other contexts in
which multiple individuals may need to be questioned are when
there are multiple eyewitnesses to a specific crime or when a
suspect reports an alibi witness (someone who can provide an
account of the whereabouts of a suspect at a location other than
the crime scene at the time the crime took place; Dahl and
Price, 2012). Additionally, some criminal groups may consist
of members who are involved only in the planning, or in the
aftermath, of an offense, but not in the actual commission of
the offense itself. Similar to alibi witnesses, these group members
will be collaborators of the crime but not active participants.
Despite having different group dynamics to multiple suspects,
there is still the potential for investigators to question more
than one person about the same crime/event. However, in these
contexts the aim for investigators is to determine the accuracy
of the information provided by the eyewitnesses, to determine
whether the alibi witness is true or false, or to determine the
differing roles played by the group members in the offense
process.
Although investigators often have to question groups, whether
it is multiple suspects, multiple eyewitnesses, or alibi witness
situations, the number of deception detection studies involving
groups is limited. Our literature search found only 20 studies
published on the topic of verbal group deception (see Table 1). All
20 studies, except one, considered multiple suspects; therefore it
is groups of suspects that will be the primary focus of the current
review. The aim of the current review article is to collate and
discuss the research that has been conducted into interviewing
groups to detect deceit and to discuss the theoretical implications
of this upcoming research area. The review will consider the
differences between groups and individuals, and will report
the different aspects of the extant group deception studies, for
example, interviewing group members separately vs. interviewing
group members simultaneously. Throughout, the review gaps
in the literature will be identified with suggestions for future
studies. The current review will focus on the verbal indicators
of deceit and therefore studies measuring physiological measures
to detect deceit in groups will not be discussed (see Bradley and
Barefoot, 2010; Meijer et al., 2010, 2013, for studies using the
Concealed Information Test (CIT) to extract information from
groups).
DEFINING A GROUP
A group can be defined as “two or more individuals who
are connected to one another by social relationships” (Forsyth,
2006, p. 3). Group deception studies, to date, have primarily
focused on dyads, and the majority of group offenses in real-
life involve dyads (Hodgson and Costello, 2006). Nevertheless,
it is important to note that there is much debate within the
group dynamics literature with regard to the definition of
a ‘group’ and whether a dyad actually constitutes a group
(often referred to as the Moreland-Williams debate). Levine and
Moreland (2012) argue that dyads are not groups because the
number of individuals within the group matters. That is, larger
groups involve different group processes. They state that dyads
are different from larger groups because; (1) they form and
dissolve more quickly; (2) they are more emotionally involved
with one another; and (3) certain social phenomena, such as
minority/majority relations, cannot be applied unless there is
more than two people in the group. In contrast, Williams (2010)
states that dyads should come under the definition of a group
because group processes, such as social loafing and facilitation
or ingroup/outgroup, occur regardless of whether there are
two or several people in the group. Consequently, dyads are
appropriate targets for investigation. Williams (2010) reports
that it is the scientific methods employed which are important
to ensure that reliable data is collected about how individuals
behave when around others. If dyads do not constitute a group,
nor are they individuals, then dyads will need to be studied
as a field on their own. As a result of this controversial
debate within the group dynamics literature, it is important
that group size is considered when interpreting the findings
and forming conclusions from the current review. Nevertheless,
the fact that dyads are different from individuals regardless
of whether they come under the term ‘group,’ means that the
current review is still necessary and relevant for those involved
in investigative interviewing and detecting deception. For the
purpose of the current review and in line with the definition by
Forsyth (2006) mentioned above, dyads will be thought of as a
group.
GROUP DECEPTION: HOW ARE
GROUPS DIFFERENT FROM
INDIVIDUALS?
Although the knowledge-base surrounding detecting deceit
in groups is limited, it is important to acknowledge that
groups are different from individuals (e.g., in terms of shared
responsibility and peer support; Warr, 2002). Consequently,
there are numerous reasons why it is important to expand
the investigative interviewing and deception detection literature
to include groups. First, the characteristics of group offenders
differ from the characteristics of solo offenders. For example,
co-offenders are typically younger than solo offenders (Van
Mastrigt and Farrington, 2009). Furthermore, it seems that
groups are more strategic and view honesty and deception
differently from individuals. Groups, for instance, lie more than
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TABLE 1 | Overview of the group deception studies completed so far, which measure verbal cues (spanning across 11 years from 2003 to 2014).
Group deception study Theoretical principle
examined
Interview
style
Study manipulation Number of
interviewees
Adults or
children?
Published?
Granhag et al., 2013 Strategies Individual SUE technique 3 Adults Yes
Vrij et al., 2010c Strategies Individual (Un)anticipated questions 2 Adults Yes
Chan and Bull, 2014 Consistency Individual Effect of co-planning 2 Adults Yes
Granhag et al., 2014 Consistency Individual SUE technique 3 Adults Yes
Granhag et al., 2003 Consistency Individual Repeated interviews 2 Adults Yes
Leins et al., 2011 Consistency Individual Drawings 2 Adults Yes
Mac Giolla and Granhag, 2015 Consistency Individual (Un)anticipated questions: intentions 3 Adults Yes
Roos af Hjelmsäter et al., 2014 Consistency Individual Sketches 3 Children Yes
Sooniste et al., 2014 Consistency Individual (Un)anticipated questions: intentions 2 and 4 Adults Yes
Strömwall and Granhag, 2007 Consistency Individual Response mode of observers 2 Children Yes
Strömwall et al., 2003 Consistency Individual Repeated interviews 2 Adults Yes
Vredeveldt and Wagenaar, 2013 Consistency Individual (Un)anticipated questions 2 Children Yes
Vrij et al., 2009 Consistency Individual (Un)anticipated questions 2 Adults Yes
Driskell et al., 2012 Memory Collective Brief investigative interview 2 Adults Yes
Jundi et al., 2013a Memory Collective Timeline task 2 Adults Yes
Jundi et al., 2013b Memory Collective Pairs’ monitoring of the interviewer 2 Adults Yes
Vernham et al., 2014a Memory Collective (Un)anticipated questions 2 Adults Yes
Vrij et al., 2012 Memory Collective (Un)anticipated questions 2 Adults Yes
Vernham et al., 2014b Imposing cognitive load Collective Forced turn-taking technique 2 Adults Yes
Nahari and Vrij, 2014∗ Verifiability approach Collective Written statements 2 Adults Yes
SUE, Strategic Use of Evidence.
∗This study involved alibi witness scenarios as opposed to multiple suspects.
individuals (Cohen et al., 2009) and are more likely to use honesty
strategically in order to maximize their own outcomes (e.g.,
financial payoffs; Sutter, 2009). Groups also report more self-
interest (both collective self-interest and individual self-interest)
and fewer concerns about using deception in comparison to
individuals (Cohen et al., 2009). These differences in motives,
strategies and behaviors highlight the need to understand
group deception as well as individual deception. Additionally,
there are specific crimes (e.g., organized crime, terrorism, drug
trafficking, burglary, arson) and multiple investigative settings
(e.g., immigration, airport security, border control, police stop
and search) that are more likely to involve groups of offenders as
opposed to lone offenders (Carrington, 2002; Van Mastrigt and
Farrington, 2009).
Second, the interviewing of groups brings a different dynamic
to the interview process. This allows for different interview
approaches to be applied and enables the identification of
unique cues to deceit that can only emerge when groups
are interviewed. A central issue that investigators face is
whether to interview groups individually (i.e., interviewing of
group members separately) or collectively (i.e., interviewing of
group members simultaneously). Interviewing group members
individually provides the potential to examine within-group
consistency (Strömwall et al., 2003; Granhag et al., 2014), which
cannot be measured when interviewing a lone individual about
a solo crime. Additionally, collective interviewing allows for
communication and interaction cues to be examined (Driskell
et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012; Jundi et al., 2013b; Vernham
et al., 2014b), and these cues cannot emerge when interviewing
a lone individual about a solo crime or when individually
interviewing group members about a joint crime. Currently,
police typically conduct individual interviews during their
investigations regardless of the number of suspects. Nonetheless,
there are some existing procedures where collective interviewing
is employed. For example, in the UK, immigration officers
occasionally use collective interviewing when attempting to
uncover sham marriages (Home Office, 2013), and police
detectives often interview people in groups when making house-
to-house enquiries (College of Policing, 2013). In Canada,
customs officers carry out collective interviews at airports because
members of the same group are deemed to have a ‘similar
agenda’ (i.e., it is assumed that group members traveling together
are traveling to the same destination for the same purpose).
Thus, if only one person in the group is examined, this could
result in a wasted effort or missed opportunity. That is, the
interviewing of group members individually will be less time-
efficient and may result in specific individuals who need to be
interviewed being disregarded (personal communication with
a Canadian ex-immigration officer, 12th November 2013). By
extending the research agenda to include collective interviewing,
research can inform on the best practices for such situations
and has the potential to uncover new applied contexts where
collective interviewing may be appropriate.
Third, for groups you can determine deception at a social level
as well as at an individual level. In other words, interviewing
groups of suspects not only allows for the additional consistency
and social cues (as mentioned above) to be measured, but
also allows for the measurement of established deception cues
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within each individual of the group (e.g., within-statement
consistency, number of details, admitting lack of memory,
plausibility, spontaneous corrections; Granhag and Strömwall,
1999; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2005, 2008). Therefore, by
examining individual deception and group deception more cues
to deceit can emerge from interviewing group members about
joint events than from interviewing lone individuals about solo
events. The identification of both known and novel cues to
deceit from groups is important if we are to improve the poor
accuracy rates typically found within the detection deception
literature (Bond and DePaulo, 2006) and obtain knowledge
of what cues are best to focus on in each given investigative
situation.
Fourth, when multiple people need to be questioned, each
member of the group loses some control over what information
is provided and how each member behaves. Therefore, not only
do they have to ‘impression manage’ themselves (i.e., regulate
and control what information they say), but they also have to
‘impression manage’ others (i.e., attempt to regulate, predict,
and control what others say). This suggests that the strategies
employed by groups will differ from the strategies employed
by lone individuals because group members will not be as
successful as lone individuals when improvising on the spot
during the interview. This will be the case regardless of whether
the group members are interviewed individually or collectively.
The notion of impression management can be linked to research
examining the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ (Rapoport and Chammah,
1965; Poundstone, 1992), especially when group members are
interviewed separately about a crime. That is, each member of
the group will need to make a decision about whether they can
trust the other group members to cooperate with the group and
not the police. Such reasoning is difficult. Therefore the added
task of impression managing others implies that group situations
are naturally more cognitively demanding: not only do you have
to think about and remember what you have said but you also
need to consider what others have said or might be saying.
Research shows that increased cognitive load results in more
cues to deceit (Vrij et al., 2008, 2010b). Hence, cues to deceit
may not only be more numerous but also strengthened in group
situations.
In order for law enforcement to be competent in dealing
with all forms of crime-related incidents, they need to be
trained in a variety of interview techniques that enable them
to question both individuals and groups. Different situations
may require different interviewing techniques. It is therefore
important that investigators have a wide range of all the necessary
skills to be able to use the most appropriate interview strategy
for the situation at hand, and to be able to recognize the
cues indicative of deceit that emerge from implementing that
particular interview technique. For example, if there is only
one interviewer available but multiple suspects, employing a
collective interviewing approach would be most convenient
and time-efficient. When this approach is implemented, the
focus should be on cues associated with how the interviewees
interact and communicate with one another, such as verbal
transitions (Driskell et al., 2012) or eye contact (Jundi et al.,
2013b).
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
DETECTING DECEPTION WITHIN
GROUPS: WHAT DO THE EXISTING
DECEPTION STUDIES TELL US?
From a theoretical perspective, research on the interviewing of
groups contributes to the knowledge-base within the deception
literature. It adds to the consistency research (e.g., repeat
vs. reconstructive hypothesis; Granhag and Strömwall, 1999),
compliments memory research (e.g., collaborative learning and
remembering), and can be applied to the theories of co-
offending (e.g., social exchange theory; Weerman, 2003) and
other group processes (e.g., group formation and leadership).
Hence, the interviewing of groups about joint events not only
allows for the development of new interview techniques that
increase information elicitation (crucial to detecting deceit), but
also allows for additional theories and concepts to be applied
to deception that cannot be applied when interviewing lone
individuals about solo events. In the following sections, we will
review the existing deception research on group interviewing
which has contributed to the literature on; counter-interrogation
strategies (e.g., Granhag et al., 2013), within-group consistency
(e.g., Strömwall et al., 2003), transactive memory (e.g., Wegner,
1987), and collective memory (e.g., Barnier and Sutton, 2008).
We will also highlight theoretical positions we feel are of utmost
relevance to group deception, but have yet to be empirically
examined, such as group dynamics (e.g., Arrow et al., 2000).
Strategies
Knowledge about the strategies that truth-tellers and liars employ
is important if investigators are to have insight into what truth-
tellers and liars will say, and how they will behave, during
an interview. If this is known, more insight can be acquired
with regard to the deception cues that may arise, and most
importantly, more effective and theory-based interview protocols
can be developed to help improve investigators’ abilities to
accurately detect deceit (see Granhag et al., 2015 for an overview).
Despite this, most research has focused on the verbal and non-
verbal behaviors of truth-tellers and liars, with little research
being conducted into the actual strategies that truth-tellers and
liars employ to appear credible (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij,
2008). This is particularly the case for the strategies employed
by truth-telling groups and lying groups (see Vrij et al., 2010c;
Granhag et al., 2013 for the only two deception studies to examine
group strategies when individual interviewing is applied).
When faced with the situation of being questioned about
their activities or whereabouts at the time of a crime, truth-
tellers and liars (whether an individual or part of a group)
have the same goal and that is to convince the interviewer of
their innocence (Granhag and Hartwig, 2008). Research into
the differing strategies employed by truth-telling groups and
lying groups, when group members are interviewed individually,
demonstrates that although there are no differences in terms
of the non-verbal strategies (e.g., both truth-telling groups and
lying groups plan to suppress nervous behaviors), there are key
differences in terms of the verbal strategies they use (i.e., how
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they provide information; Vrij et al., 2010c). This is also the case
for the non-verbal and verbal strategies used by lone individuals
(Strömwall et al., 2006).
Truth-telling groups are less likely to have a strategy than
lying groups because truth-tellers believe in a ‘just world’
(Lerner, 1980) and that the truth will shine through (‘illusion of
transparency’; Gilovich et al., 1998). Consequently, they rely on
memory, as opposed to preparation, to provide their answers.
Truth-telling groups prefer a ‘tell it all’ strategy that aims to
provide an honest and detailed description of what actually
occurred (Vrij et al., 2010c; Granhag et al., 2013). Even when part
of a group, truth-tellers do not feel the need to prepare, believing
their statements will naturally be consistent with one another.
The only time truth-telling groups may prepare is to run through
what happened in order to remind one another of the details of
the event (Vrij et al., 2010c).
Conversely, lying groups, who are less likely to take their
credibility for granted, are more likely to prepare for an interview.
They plan what to say beforehand and prepare fabricated stories
that are coherent and plausible. Lying groups prepare joint
alibis, preferring a ‘keep it simple’ strategy in order to avoid
raising suspicion and to ensure consistency within and between
their statements (Vrij et al., 2010c; Granhag et al., 2013). They
will prepare answers to possible questions to ‘get their stories
straight,’ but their answers will be restrictive and vague to reduce
the chances of them contradicting one another or providing
incriminating evidence (Vrij et al., 2010c; Granhag et al., 2013).
These differing strategies employed by groups of truth-tellers
and groups of liars results in the statements from lying groups
being less detailed than the statements from truth-telling groups.
However, because lying groups have planned what to say together,
their statements are often as consistent as the statements of
truth-telling groups (Granhag et al., 2003; Chan and Bull, 2014).
As a result of the strategies that lying groups employ,
opportunity for planning is likely to be an important moderator
of credibility. Research on lone individuals has shown that liars
who prepare for an interview are more difficult to distinguish
from truth-tellers, than liars who do not prepare (O’Hair et al.,
1981; Bond and DePaulo, 2006). Preparing what to say in an
interview enhances liars’ deceptive performance (Granhag et al.,
2004) by making their statements not only more consistent than
truth-tellers’ (Granhag et al., 2003), but also more immediate and
plausible (Chan and Bull, 2014). Consequently, the emergence of
cues to deceit is reduced (DePaulo et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the
influence of opportunity to plan has not been empirically tested
in groups of interviewees, and therefore studies examining the
effects of planning on lie catchers’ abilities to distinguish between
groups of truth-tellers and groups of liars are required.
The Al Qaeda Handbook (a terrorist training manual found
in 2000 by Manchester police in England) offers further insights
into the strategies of groups of suspects. Amongst other things,
this handbook underscores the importance of a group security
plan that all group members are to commit to. This plan
emphasizes the importance of teamwork and explains how to
undertake group missions, which includes practicing answers
to a list of anticipated interview questions. Additionally, it
covers counter-interrogation strategies. Of specific relevance to
group interviewing situations are the strategies that state; (i)
always stick to the cover story even when shown evidence of
involvement, and (ii) if interrogators state that other group
members have revealed information, just agree, but do not state
any additional information. This manual therefore gives insight
into the types of strategies that groups may employ in order to;
(1) co-ordinate with other group members; (2) avoid revealing
incriminating information; and (3) avoid deviating from the
group security plan. However, it assumes that group members
will be interviewed separately. Therefore, interviewing group
members collectively may be an interview tactic that groups
typically do not prepare for, which may increase cues to deceit.
To summarize, the fact that research shows that groups
of truth-tellers and groups of liars use the same non-verbal
strategies but different verbal strategies helps to explain why
verbal cues are deemed more diagnostic to deceit, than non-
verbal cues (which is the case for both adults and children;
Strömwall and Granhag, 2007; Vrij, 2008). Furthermore, whether
a lone individual or part of a group, the strategies employed
seem to be very similar. However, there are likely to be key
differences with regard to the strategies employed by truth-
tellers and liars depending on whether they are part of a group
(as suggested by the Al Qaeda Handbook), because groups will
need to decide what to do if the planned strategies cannot be
employed during the interview. More studies investigating the
strategies that groups of truth-tellers and groups of liars employ
are required. The few deception studies that have considered
strategies have involved interviewing groups consisting of two
or three members separately. This means that the strategies
employed by larger groups have been ignored, as have the
strategies employed by groups interviewed collectively. Group
size is unlikely to influence the counter-interrogation strategies
employed, because the theoretical principles of the strategies
remain the same. However, the outcome of implementing the
strategies may differ as group size increases, because the ability to
remain consistent will become more challenging. Future studies
will need to examine this before any conclusions can be drawn.
Collective interviewing raises further questions with regard to
suspect strategies. For instance, will group strategies cover the
communication and interaction cues that are available during
collective interviewing? Or how do group members react and
alter their strategies when informed that one group member
has provided information other than that agreed upon in the
pre-planned story? Future research on group strategies should
address such questions.
Consistency
Verbal consistency is regarded by many as an important cue
to deceit. Both laymen (The Global Deception Research Team,
2006) and professionals (Akehurst et al., 1996; Strömwall and
Granhag, 2003) assume that inconsistency is indicative of deceit.
However, it is often overlooked that consistency comes in many
forms. Single statements can be examined for within-statement
consistency (the level of consistency within one statement from
an individual), while repeated statements can be examined
for between-statement consistency (the level of consistency
between multiple statements from one individual). When groups
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of individuals are interviewed seperately an additional form
of consistency emerges: within-group consistency (the level
of consistency between statements from group members; see
Vredeveldt et al., 2014, for an overview of consistency cues in
deception contexts). The first studies on group deception began
with this cue in mind (Granhag et al., 2003; Strömwall et al.,
2003), and, considering the importance that people place on
consistency as a cue to deceit, it is perhaps not surprising that
the majority of studies on group deception have continued to
focus on this cue (see Table 1). However, it is important to
note that all the group deception studies that have considered
consistency as a cue to deceit have involved interviewing the
group members individually. Future studies should consider
measuring consistency as a possible cue to deceit in collective
interviewing situations.
If the strategies that truth-telling groups and lying groups
employ are taken into consideration (i.e., truth-tellers rely on
memory whereas liars plan what to say), it may be problematic
to assume that truth-tellers are more consistent than liars.
Accordingly, the consistency of truth-telling groups is often equal
to (or even weaker) than the consistency of lying groups (e.g.,
Granhag et al., 2003; Strömwall et al., 2003). To understand this
further, Granhag and Strömwall (1999) proposed the ‘repeat vs.
reconstruct’ hypothesis, which emphasizes that liars will attempt
to repeat what they have previously said and truth-tellers will
try to reconstruct what they actually experienced. When truth-
tellers are asked to repeat answers, their memory restructures
the event so they gain, lose, and change information over time
(Baddeley, 1990), thus reducing consistency. In contrast, liars
merely repeat what they originally prepared, thus promoting
consistency. Although, the ‘repeat vs. reconstruct’ hypothesis was
originally developed to measure the consistency between two
statements from the same interviewees (Granhag and Strömwall,
1999), later research has found that this hypothesis can also
be applied when measuring the consistency between statements
of multiple interviewees (e.g., Granhag et al., 2003). Research
suggests that there is a variation in the types of details that
groups provide, with truth-telling groups focusing more on the
salient aspects of an event than lying groups. Thus, when these
salient aspects are compared, consistency is significantly greater
for truth-telling groups compared with lying groups (Roos af
Hjelmsäter et al., 2014). Future research should consider whether
there are specific types of details that truth-tellers reconstruct and
liars repeat (e.g., salient/central details vs. non-salient/general
details).
Relevant to the ‘repeat vs. reconstruct’ hypothesis is the
‘reminiscence effect’ which suggests that repeated questioning
results in the recall of previously unrecalled items (referred
to as commission errors; Payne, 1987). This effect has been
found to be stronger for truthful statements than for deceptive
statements (Granhag et al., 2003). Therefore, in contradiction to
the stereotypical belief that consistency implies truthfulness (see
‘consistency heuristic’ literature; Granhag and Strömwall, 2000),
it is clear that lie catchers need to be cautious when interpreting
consistent statements as truthful and inconsistent statements as
deceitful. In fact, the diagnostic value (i.e., predictive accuracy)
of using consistency to judge veracity in groups is modest for
both adults (Strömwall et al., 2003 obtained overall accuracy
rates of between 52.5 and 70%) and children (Strömwall and
Granhag, 2007 obtained an overall accuracy rate of 62.5%). These
modest accuracy rates are not only because lie catchers are
exercising the consistency heuristic incorrectly, but also because
judging consistency is a subjective task (i.e., different observers
can perceive the same set of statements differently in terms of
consistency; Granhag and Strömwall, 2000).
The diagnostic value of the consistency cue can vary
depending on the response mode used. The response mode refers
to the stage at which a lie catcher makes a veracity judgment,
and this can vary when you have repeated interviewing and/or
groups of interviewees. Research implies that observers are more
accurate at using the consistency cue when they use a step-by-
step response mode (observers make a veracity judgment after
seeing each interrogation) compared to when they use an end-of-
sequence response mode (observers make one veracity judgment
after seeing all interrogations with all group members). This is
because the step-by-step response mode facilitates more effective
information processing of inconsistencies (Strömwall et al., 2003;
Strömwall and Granhag, 2007). Therefore, the diagnostic value
of the consistency cue improves because there is a reduction
in the degree of truth bias (the predisposition for observers to
judge someone as telling the truth; Street and Masip, 2015).
However, the differences in accuracy rates depending on response
mode vary across the few studies available and sometimes
only approach significance (e.g., Strömwall et al., 2003); hence,
more research is needed into the effects of response mode on
the accuracy rates of detecting deceit in groups before any
conclusions can be made.
An important development in deception research in recent
years is the introduction of strategic interviewing techniques
(Vrij and Granhag, 2012). These techniques involve asking
interview questions that play on the differing strategies of truth-
tellers and liars. The most relevant method applied to within-
group consistency is simply to ask unanticipated interview
questions, which negate the benefit of planning for the interview
(Vrij et al., 2009; Lancaster et al., 2012). Unanticipated interview
questions are designed to disrupt liars’ repeat strategy, thereby
reducing within-group consistency. If framed correctly truth-
tellers’ consistency levels are unaffected because truth-tellers can
still rely on memory to answer such questions. For example, Vrij
et al. (2009) found that, when pairs were interviewed individually,
there was less agreement between the answers from lying pairs,
compared to truth-telling pairs, but only for unanticipated
interview questions, such as questions concerning spatial details
(accuracy rates for truth-tellers and liars ranged from 60 to 80%).
When anticipated interview questions were asked, no differences
were found between truth-telling pairs and lying pairs. Further
studies have supported these findings with adult groups (Leins
et al., 2011), child groups (Vredeveldt and Wagenaar, 2013; Roos
af Hjelmsäter et al., 2014), and when the statements are on true
and false intentions, as opposed to past events (Sooniste et al.,
2014; but see Mac Giolla and Granhag, 2015 where truth-tellers
showed higher levels of consistency for both anticipated and
unanticipated questions). The accuracy rates obtained for truth-
tellers and liars for the within-group studies that measure the
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classification of participants based on veracity are impressive,
ranging from approximately 60 to 100%. These studies emphasize
the need for investigators to develop interview protocols that
include both expected and unexpected questions if they are to
improve the diagnostic value of the consistency cue and enhance
the accuracy rates of lie catchers whom are detecting deceit in
groups.
When specific interview techniques are employed, such as
the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique (Hartwig et al.,
2006), a further consistency cue can be measured in addition
to those already mentioned: statement-evidence consistency
(the degree of consistency between the suspects statements
and the evidence that the interrogator holds). Granhag et al.
(2014) illustrated that when the SUE technique was employed
during individual interviews with group members, lying groups
demonstrated lower levels of statement-evidence consistency,
within-statement consistency, and within-group consistency,
compared with truth-telling groups. Consequently, if specific
interview techniques are implemented during the questioning of
groups then the issues associated with the consistency heuristic
can be eliminated. Future studies should explore the application
of other interview techniques to the interviewing of groups as well
as examining the application of the SUE technique to collective
interviewing contexts whereby group members are interviewed
simultaneously.
The theoretical and empirical research on within-group
consistency highlights both pitfalls and opportunities. On the
one hand, lie catchers should be cautioned to not simply credit
consistency and discredit inconsistency. On the other hand, the
unanticipated question approach seems to improve the diagnostic
value of the consistency cue. However, future research should
explore other cues that can be measured when applying this
approach to groups of interviewees (e.g., number of details or
types of details). Alternative interview techniques that increase
the differences between truth-telling groups and lying groups
with regard to consistency need to be considered if the diagnostic
value of the consistency cue is to improve.
Memory
It is widely acknowledged that memory plays an important role
in deception (Granhag and Vrij, 2005; Sporer and Schwandt,
2006; Verschuere et al., 2011; Walczyk et al., 2013). Research on
memory is central to verbal veracity assessment tools, such as
Reality Monitoring (RM; Johnson and Raye, 1998) and Criteria-
Based Content Analysis (CBCA; Köhnken and Steller, 1988),
while Bartlett’s (1932) proposition of reconstructive memory is
at the heart of the ‘repeat vs. reconstruct’ hypothesis discussed
above (Granhag and Strömwall, 1999). These theories approach
memory from the perspective of the individual. However,
cognitive psychologists have also considered memory as a
social process. These social theories of memory – including
collective memory (Barnier and Sutton, 2008; Rajaram, 2011)
and transactive memory (Wegner, 1987; Hollingshead, 1998) –
can offer unique insights into group deception. Social theories of
memory can be applied to group deception in situations where
multiple suspects state that they were doing something together
at the time the crime took place.
Groups influence what individuals learn and how they
remember information. Collective memory (often referred to
as collaborative learning, collaborative remembering, or joint
recall; Bartlett, 1932; Edwards and Middleton, 1987; Barnier
and Sutton, 2008; Harris et al., 2008; Rajaram, 2011; Blumen
et al., 2013) examines this social nature of memory by treating
past experiences and events as memories shared with others
(Barnier and Sutton, 2008; Hirst and Manier, 2008; Rajaram,
2011). Specifically, it explores how group members collectively
recall information together (Rajaram and Pereira-Pasarin, 2010),
and so this concept is particularly important to bear in mind
when groups of interviewees are interviewed collectively about
joint events.
The research investigating collective memory suggests that
group collaboration can aid memory through cross-cueing
(where members of the group provide cues to one another
that increase recall); error-pruning (where feedback from other
members of the group create discussions that make people
realize their recall errors); and re-exposure (hearing other group
members recall information that they themselves had forgotten;
Ross et al., 2008; Blumen and Stern, 2011; Rajaram, 2011).
When groups of truth-tellers are asked to recall a shared event
together, they collectively recall the information, which results in
truth-telling groups exhibiting interactions and communications
that cannot be unveiled when they are interviewed individually
(e.g., posing questions to one another, looking at one another,
continuing on from one another, correcting one another,
adding information to each other’s accounts, finishing each
other’s sentences). Collective interviewing deception studies have
shown that these interactions and communications occur more
frequently for truth-telling groups than for lying groups (Driskell
et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012; Jundi et al., 2013a,b; Vernham et al.,
2014a,b). This is because the lying group members are merely
recalling their planned, vague, fabricated story (Granhag et al.,
2003; Strömwall et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010a).
The theory of transactive memory can also be applied to
group deception research (Driskell et al., 2012; Jundi et al., 2013a;
Vernham et al., 2014a). This theory is concerned with how groups
(and individuals) process and structure information with regard
to past events. It was originally developed to examine memory
processes within intimate couples (Wegner, 1987), but has now
been applied to various different forms of group relationships
(including larger networks), such as team performance and
knowledge management within the work place (Argote et al.,
2003; Lee and Choi, 2003; Lewis, 2004). The theory proposes that
people in close relationships share cognition and ‘think together’
by knowing each other’s memory expertise and treating one
another as external memory aids (Wegner, 1987). This results in
a specialized transactive memory system or ‘division of labor’ that
is greater than the total of all the individual memories (Wegner
et al., 1985, 1991).
The transactive memory system is active at all three stages
of memory formation: encoding, storing, and retrieving. First,
when information is encoded regarding a shared experience,
responsibility for information is automatically divided and shared
between all members of the group, so that each person knows
what they are to remember as well as what the other group
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members are to remember (Hollingshead and Brandon, 2003).
Second, when information is stored, each individual within
the pair has remembering responsibilities, knowing what their
role is, what they are to remember, and what information the
other group members have access to Wegner et al. (1991).
Third, retrieval of information is social and interactive as the
group members communicate with one another to retrieve as
much information as possible. The communication with one
another and the discussion of incoming information enhances
their individual recollections. Hollingshead (1998) refers to
the ‘transaction memory search’ whereby group members who
have experienced a past shared event make instinctive use of
their transactive memory system to increase recall by posing
questions to one another to check information or find out
information, cueing one another to remind each other of further
information, and handing over remembering responsibility to
whoever best remembers that part of the event. These interactive
and communicative behaviors between the group members help
one another tap into their different memory domains and trigger
further information, increasing recall.
When applied to a collective interviewing context, it has
been shown that the honest groups display these fundamental
interactive and communicative behaviors during joint recall
significantly more than the lying groups (Vernham et al., 2014a).
Lying groups, after all, are inventing shared events. Without
the shared transactive memory system for encoding, storing
and retrieving information, lying group members rely on their
individual cognitive abilities to create a story that makes sense
and matches with what the other group members are saying
(Hintz, 1990). This makes it difficult for lying groups to illustrate
the same degree of interactive and communicative behaviors
as truth-telling groups. Consequently, deceptive communication
from group members interviewed collectively is characterized by
the absence of social and interactive behaviors as they recall their
fabricated story (Driskell et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012; Jundi et al.,
2013a,b; Vernham et al., 2014a,b), and only provide prepared
answers to expected questions (Granhag et al., 2003; Strömwall
et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010a).
To summarize, reconstructive memory can help explain
the differences between truth-telling groups and lying groups
regardless of whether the group members are interviewed
individually or collectively, whereas collective memory and
transactive memory can most appropriately be applied to the
context of collective interviewing. Nevertheless, all three theories
highlight the important role that memory plays in the recall of
information and thus the detection of deception. That is, group
members recalling an actual experienced joint event will do so
in a different manner to group members who are attempting to
recall a fabricated joint event, and the more that is understood
about these differences in recall, the more that can be learnt
about the possible cues to deception that may arise from groups.
Future studies that explore groups within the area of investigative
interviewing and deception detection should consider memory
and the effects of joint recall on cues to deceit.
Although group collaboration can aid memory, it can also
hinder memory. This is because other people can act as a source
of misinformation whereby people conform to what other group
members are saying regardless of what they themselves actually
remember (Loftus, 2005). Additionally, memory contamination
can occur whereby one group member causes other group
members to remember information incorrectly (Gabbert et al.,
2003). Whilst the memory literature suggests that collaborative
groups (group members recalling information together) recall
significantly more information than individual group members
(each group member recalling information alone), some studies
show that nominal groups (pooled individuals whereby the
group members recall information individually, but details are
summed so that any duplicate details are removed) recall
significantly more information than collaborative groups (often
referred to as collaborative inhibition; Basden et al., 1997; Weldon
and Bellinger, 1997). Consequently, this collaborative inhibition
needs to be considered when interviewing groups collectively to
detect deceit.
Collaborative inhibition implies that interviewing group
members separately is better than interviewing group members
collectively (in terms of the amount of information obtained).
However, individual interviewing of groups requires more
resources and time, and is not suitable for all situations where
groups need to be interviewed, for example, when there is only
one interviewer available but multiple suspects (e.g., during
police ‘stop and search’ or at road border control where cars
containing multiple people need to be questioned). Additionally,
separating the group to be interviewed removes the ability to
measure communicative and interactive cues as indicators of
deceit. Future research needs to consider what technique –
interviewing group members individually or interviewing group
members collectively – leads to the most accurate recall of
information and also elicits useful, and identifiable, cues to deceit.
It is likely that a combination of both individual interviewing,
and collective interviewing, of group members will be required
if all circumstances in which groups need to be questioned are
considered. If interviewing groups individually and interviewing
groups collectively are implemented into practice, future studies
need to determine which interviewing technique should be
implemented in which contexts, and if both techniques are
needed for a particular situation, then the sequence in which they
should be conducted needs to be established (i.e., interview the
group collectively then individually or vice versa?).
Group Dynamics
Before mentioning the key concepts behind group dynamics and
how these may affect deception detection, we feel it important
to briefly mention theories of co-offending. At least four co-
offending theories have been proposed; (1) group influence (social
learning and group pressure lead to co-offending; Akers, 1973);
(2) social selection (offenders select each other because they share
similar characteristics and interests; Feld, 1981); (3) instrumental
(co-offending is easier, more profitable, and less risky than solo
offending; Walsh, 1986); (4) social exchange (co-offending is a
social exchange whereby offenders receive material reward, e.g.,
payments, and immaterial reward, e.g., social acceptance, that
cannot be obtained via solo offending; Weerman, 2003).
Whilst the social exchange theory explains more of the
characteristics associated with co-offending than the other three
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theories, none of the co-offending theories fully explain all the
characteristics necessary to understand this type of offending.
However, taken together, the theories explain: (1) why offenders
choose to co-offend; (2) how co-offending takes place; (3) why
there is variation between offense types in terms of the proportion
of co-offending to solo offending; and (4) the instability of
offending groups. An understanding of co-offending and the
ways in which offenders select one another and form groups
could help investigators develop more appropriate techniques
for dealing with groups of offenders, particularly when it comes
to establishing the best ways of interviewing these groups and
determining whether they are guilty of a crime. According to
social exchange theory, who is involved in a particular crime
depends on which group members are available and willing
(Weerman, 2003). This means that on some occasions not
all group members are involved in the offense; therefore it
is important to learn how different group members behave
during the investigation process depending on whether they were
actually involved in committing the offense (i.e., they know the
specific details), or whether they are just aware of the offense (i.e.,
they only know who was involved, but not any details). Group
members with differing knowledge about the crime will have an
impact upon the amount of information that is revealed during
an interview. Consequently, it is important to develop tactics
that can be used to establish who knows what within a group.
However, to date, no empirical studies have considered the level
of knowledge distribution throughout a group and how this can
affect cues to deceit.
When investigating a crime, co-offending adds a whole new
aspect to detecting deceit that is not present with solo offending,
group dynamics. Groups emerge when multiple people work
together. Each of the group members bond (labeled group
formation; Arrow et al., 2000), and as the co-offending theories
illustrate, group formation is important to those offenders who
are working alongside others. Groups form a structure with each
member having a different role and status within the group;
thus, if more can be known about how best to interview group
members depending on their role or status within the group
then more interview protocols can be developed to aid the
detection of group deception. Unlike consistency and memory
processes, group dynamics have not yet been examined in
the deception detection literature, so, at present, we can only
speculate about how group processes may influence deception
and subsequently cues to deceit. We suggest three potential areas
of group dynamics that may be relevant to deception contexts:
group cohesiveness (Festinger, 1950); roles or status levels of
group members (Hollander, 1985; Chemers, 2001); and cultural
influences (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Hui, 1988).
Group cohesiveness refers to the properties of a group that
effectively bind the group members together to give the group a
sense of solidarity (Festinger, 1950). There is suggestive evidence
that groups of liars may view threats to group cohesiveness
as threats to the group’s credibility. As such, groups of liars
may be more concerned with maintaining an air of group
cohesion compared to groups of truth-tellers. For instance, liars
place weight on maintaining within-group consistency (Granhag
et al., 2013), in contrast truth-tellers in collective interviewing
situations may be more likely to disrupt or disagree with group
members (Vrij et al., 2012). More nuanced measures of group
cohesiveness could provide better cues to deceit.
The roles or levels of status that develop within a group may
also be of interest. Roles facilitate group functioning, influencing
how group members behave and communicate with one another.
For example, those of a higher status (i.e., leaders who are deemed
to be more knowledgeable and able to initiate the ideas and
activities adopted by the group) will be respected more than
those who are of a lower status (Hollander, 1985; Chemers, 2001).
Consequently, group members who are of a lower status will be
more reluctant to express disagreement with those of a higher
status, but more willing to express disagreement with those who
are of an equal or lower status to themselves. Communication
and interaction cues are important when groups are interviewed
collectively (Driskell et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012; Vernham et al.,
2014a). By attending to group roles and the status of group
members it may be possible to develop more accurate or even
novel communication and interaction cues.
A final concept to consider is how cultural influences can
impact group dynamics. Individualistic cultures (predominantly
Western societies) highlight the importance of self-reliance,
emphasizing individual needs before those of the group.
Conversely, collectivistic cultures (predominantly Eastern
societies) highlight the importance of interdependence, where
the well-being of each individual is related to the success of the
group. Emphasis is put on group loyalty and conformity, with the
self-identity of each individual developing from the relationships
and interconnectedness between all group members (Hofstede,
1980, 2001; Hui, 1988). The studies that have been conducted
with regard to interviewing groups to detect deceit have involved
participants from individualistic cultures (e.g., UK, USA, and
Sweden). It is expected that findings from group deception
studies using participants who support collectivism will be
different from those participants who support individualism
in terms of the behaviors that they show for protecting the
group. It is believed that any findings obtained will be stronger
from participants in collectivistic cultures because supporting
the group will be more important to them, than those in
individualistic cultures. Future research should address the
influence of culture on group deception.
To summarize, although co-offending theories and
psychological theories associated with group dynamics have
not yet been applied to deception detection, they are relevant to
how group members behave when being questioned. A better
understanding of group dynamics will assist investigators with
the best ways of interviewing group members and as a result aid
with the detection of deception amongst groups.
FUTURE RESEARCH IDEAS
The importance of studying groups (as opposed to lone
individuals) is increasingly being recognized within the
investigative interviewing and deception detection literature.
However, until very recently, the focus was purely on
interviewing group members separately (individual inter-
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viewing). Nowadays, studies are also being conducted
into interviewing group members simultaneously (collective
interviewing; see Vernham and Vrij, 2015 for an overview of this
research). Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go before a
more complete understanding of the deception occurring within
groups and how to detect it is established. Future research ideas
have been mentioned throughout the current review; however,
there are some additional issues that should be considered if the
true effectiveness of detecting deception within groups is to be
recognized.
First, deception studies need to consider larger groups. At
present, deception studies predominantly involve dyads, with
only a few studies considering larger groups (e.g., Granhag
et al., 2014 used triads and Sooniste et al., 2014 used quartets).
It should be possible to apply the findings obtained from the
already completed deception experiments using groups to future
studies with more than two interviewees, because the theoretical
rationale on which the already obtained findings are based
(e.g., consistency heuristic, reconstructive memory, transactive
memory) should remain the same regardless of group size.
However, as group size increases, it is likely that more cues to
deceit will be elicited, because the interview process will become
more challenging (particularly for liars) as each group member
will have more people to manage and correspond with.
Second, there are a number of group processes that could
be explored in addition to the ones already mentioned. For
example, it would be interesting to consider what would happen
if individual group members do not know whether their fellow
group members are also being interviewed – how does this affect
their choice of strategy and the information they disclose? The
‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ is similar, but the group members would
instead need to make decisions about cooperating with the group
when lacking the knowledge about which group members are
actually being interviewed. Additionally, the order in which
each group member thinks they are being interviewed could be
strategically used during an interview. For example, does the
amount of information produced and the elicitation of cues to
deceit depend on whether the group member believes they are
first, or last, to be questioned? Another idea for a further study
would be to include an additional dependent variable where each
group member is asked who else they think is being questioned
and what information they think their fellow group members will
provide.
Third, deception detection studies tend to compare truth-
telling participants with lying participants who have perpetrated
some kind of misdemeanor that is engineered by the researchers.
In real-life, it is not necessarily this clear-cut, especially if
a guilty group of suspects has completely innocent people
within it. Future research should explore how mixed groups of
innocent and guilty individuals behave when interviewed either
individually or collectively, and what cues to deceit emerge.
Fourth, the current review has considered each of the theories
associated with group deceit as if they are independent of one
another. However, it would be interesting for future studies to not
only consider the application of each of the individual theories to
group deceit and its detection, but also to consider the application
of a combination of the theories to group deceit and its detection.
For example, the link between joint memory recall and group
dynamics and the effect this has on the elicitation of cues to
deceit.
Fifth, the vast majority of studies have focused on co-
offenders when other group situations are relevant for law
enforcement. To our knowledge, the study by Nahari and
Vrij (2014) examining deception in alibi witness situations,
is the only group deception study to consider groups
other than co-offenders. For a complete understanding of
group deception more research of this kind is essential.
Additionally, research exploring the best way of determining
the accuracy of information provided when multiple witnesses
are questioned about the same crime/event would contribute
to the knowledge-base on the elicitation of information from
groups.
Finally, studies examining the individual interviewing of
groups have focused primarily on consistency as a cue to
deceit, whereas collective interviewing studies have focused
primarily on social cues to deceit. Future studies should therefore
measure alternative cues when group members are interviewed
individually and/or collectively in order to determine what other
cues to deceit can be elicited from groups to enable the correct
classification of groups based on veracity.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Over recent years research has increased our knowledge about
what is happening during suspect interviews (e.g., Soukara et al.,
2009; Walsh and Bull, 2010). However, in order to inform
practice, there is a need to reach beyond descriptive research
that focuses on gathering facts, and set up studies that can
generate more normative knowledge. By doing such research one
can identify how the current approaches that are used during
investigative interviewing can be improved, which can also help
to identify which approaches are most effective in each given
context.
Although some law enforcement personnel currently
conduct collective interviews in some situations, the interview
manuals and training programs typically utilized by police and
other law enforcement agencies focus on the interviewing of
lone individuals. Consequently, the interviewing tactics and
techniques that investigators are primarily taught, such as the
PEACE model (ACPO, 2001) or Behavioral Analysis Interview
(BAI; Inbau et al., 2001), and the cues to deceit that they choose
to measure (e.g., consistency or nervousness; Vrij, 2008), are
developed around research into lone individuals. Hence, these
interview manuals and training programs have very little, if
any, information about how best to interview groups and what
deception cues to observe when more than one individual is
being interviewed about a joint offense. As highlighted within
the current review, knowledge about lone individuals cannot
always translate to groups of individuals, yet co-offending
occurs frequently. The current review demonstrates that by not
truly understanding groups, a large number of opportunities
to employ novel or existing interviewing techniques to detect
deceit are being missed (e.g., the ability to apply a collective
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interviewing approach or how best to measure and elicit within-
group consistency). Hence, by offering both theoretical and
empirical insights on how to interview groups of suspects, the
current review can inform policy and practice. It suggests that the
framework of police interview manuals and training programs
should be revised to include more specific tactics and techniques
for group situations. If this occurs then investigators will have
a wider range of tools and a greater understanding of what
interviewing techniques and tactics to employ when they have
a co-offending situation and need to detect deception occurring
within groups.
Furthermore, the current review has implications that stretch
beyond the traditional law enforcement context. For example,
it might guide policy with respect to techniques for both
collecting and assessing the reliability of human intelligence.
Specifically, the recent congressional amendment—To Reaffirm
the Prohibition on Torture Amendment (2015)—strictly limits
the US interrogation procedures to the methods listed in the (US
Army Field Manual 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), 2006). The amendment
also requires the regular update of the manual based on the best
available scientific evidence. Currently, the Army Field Manual
says little about group interviewing situations. The current review
therefore acts as a first step to fill this gap and as a call for
researchers to continue important work on this topic area.
CONCLUSION
The interviewing of groups to detect deceit about joint events is
different from interviewing lone individuals to detect deceit about
solo events. In group situations, not only can group deception
be explored but so can individual deception, resulting in the
measurement of considerably more cues to deceit. This is because
unique cues that cannot be explored in lone individuals can also
be measured, such as within-group consistency or cues stemming
from the way that group members communicate and interact
with one another. Additionally, being part of a group is more
cognitively demanding in itself because each group member has
to think about what they say as well as what others might say.
Whether group members should be interviewed individually or
collectively depends on each given situation. As the current
review highlights, there are benefits to both techniques and
unique cues to deception that can emerge depending on the
interview style employed. Overall, there is the opportunity for
investigators to develop interview protocols based on group
dynamics that allows for key differences between truth-telling
groups and lying groups to emerge. There is currently a lack of
studies exploring group deception and its detection, yet a clearer
and more accurate understanding of the deception occurring
within groups and the strategies groups employ would benefit
criminal, security, and intelligence investigations; and thus be of
value to crime prevention and policy.
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